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0

n the night of May 28, 1668, an English pirate named
Robert Searles launched a raid on the city of St. Augustine,
Florida. He stole silver and other valuable goods, held for
ransom the daughters of wealthy families, and carried off black
and Native American residents to sell as slaves to the labor-hungry
Caribbean. 1 Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega (16641671) managed to reach the fort with some of the soldiers and
prevent the pirates from taking it, but he could not stop them from
sacking the city. Before leaving, Searles measured the depth of the
water in the harbor, which suggested to authorities that he planned
to return with greater forces. The attack by Searles was just one of
many raids on Spanish settlements in the mid-seventeenth century,
but it drew the attention of the royal council that governed affairs
in Spanish America, the Council of the Indies, and set in motion a
renewed flow of men and money into Florida. 2 The raid generated
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Searles also went by the alias John Davis. Manuel Luis Rafael Arana, "The Basis
1
of a Permanent Fortification," El Escribano 36 (1999), 4. Reprinted from El
Escribano 6 (October 1969).
Juan Menendez Marquez to the Queen,July 4, 1668, Santo Domingo (SD) 235,
2
Archivo General de Indias (AGI);Junta de Guerra, January 22, 1669, SD 852;
Junta de Guerra, March 8, 1669, SD 852.
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hundreds of pages of correspondence as the governor, the sergeant
major, the royal officials, and the clergy all sought to place blame
· for the attack on their rivals. 3 Most histories of Florida recognize
the Searles attack as a brief, but pivotal moment in the history of
St. Augustine since it led to the construction of the Castillo de San
Marcos. 4 The events of the raid, however, are significant in their
own right. As Jane Landers notes in this issue, the English were
already contesting the boundaries of Spanish Florida. The raid
and its aftermath illustrate the ways in which the imperial contests
between the English and the Spanish affected the daily lives of
people in Spanish St. Augustine. The documentation surrounding
the raid also presents an uncommon moment in the sources
when members of the Spanish and English worlds conversed, and
articulated openly their attitudes toward each other and toward
people of non-European descent living in the Atlantic world.

The Target
By 1668 the city of St. Augustine had several hundred residents.
The Spanish population was composed of soldiers, local families
of Spanish or mestizo heritage called Floridanos, and members
of the royal government. 5 The city was also home to a number of
slaves, free blacks, indigenous laborers, and Indios ladinos, who
had adopted Spanish culture and language. These individuals
worked as servants, carpenters, artisans, mariners, stevedores, and
shopkeepers. There were a number of small shops for dry goods,
food, and drink, as well as a mill, a parish church, a Franciscan
monastery, and a decrepit wooden fort nearly beyond repair.
According to complaints from the governor and his predecessors,

3

4

Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SD 235; Juan Menendez
Marquez to the Queen, July 4, 1668, SD 233; Governor Guerra y Vega to the
Queen, August 8, 1668, SD 225; Governor of Cuba Francisco Davila Orej6n to
the Queen, with enclosures from the Governor of Florida, October 29, 1668,
SD 233; Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to the Queen April 20,
1669, SD 852.
Arana, "The Basis of a Permanent Fortification," 4; Amy Turner Bushnell,
Situado and Sabana: Spain s Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of
Florida (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1994), 136-137; Paul
Hoffman, Floridas Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) 143-

5

144.
Letter from Bishop Don Gabriel Diaz Vara Calderon, January 4, 1676, SD 151.
For more on the seventeenth-century city, see Susan Parker's article in this
issue.
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the city's garrison was short many men and the annual subsidy, the
situado, was in arrears by several years. 6
Despite the shortage of cash, the weak defenses of St.
Augustine might have made the city seem an appealing target. The
majority of the moveable wealth in the city was composed of the
treasury funds, the altar decorations in the churches and chapels,
the luxury goods belonging to elite families, and slaves. 7 There
were far more lucrative sites to raid in the circum-Caribbean, but
St. Augustine also played a vital defensive role by ensuring the
security of Spanish shipping entering the Gulf Stream, the essential
sea route for Spanish ships returning to Europe. A strategic post
with vulnerable defenses, St. Augustine may have seemed an easy
objective to attackers. 8
Personal rivalries had also put St. Augustine in jeopardy. The
surgeon appointed to the city in 1666 was a Frenchman known
as Pedro Piques. Despite Piques' excellent professional reputation,
Governor Guerra y Vega had treated him poorly, fired him,

6

7

8

Interim Governor of Florida Don Nicolas Ponce de Leon to the King, February
19, 1664, SD 225; Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega to the King,
March 18, 1665 and April 8, 1666, SD 225. Jane Landers, Black Society in
Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 20-21. As Susan
Parker notes, the annual situado was the main source of cash in the colony. It
was a subsidy designed to support the crown employees, soldiers, sailors, and
missionaries of the colony and actually consisted of several different sources of
funds.
Governor Aranda y Avellaneda to the King, November 10, 1688, Escribanfa de
Camara (EC) 156C, AGI, cited from microfilm collection, P.K. Yonge Library,
Gainesville, Florida; John H. Hann, "Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo's
Memorial to the King of Spain," Florida Archaeology 2 (1986) , 177-179; Amy
Bushnell, "The Menendez Marquez Cattle Barony at La Chua and the
Determinants of Economic Expansion in Seventeenth-Century Florida,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 56, no. 4 (1978), 408-409.
Eugene Lyon, The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro M enendez de Aviles and the Spanish
Conquest of 1565-1568 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974), 60-62.
Correspondence mentioning the need to protect the Bahamas Channel can
be found in the reports related to the 1668 pirate attack and the founding of
Charleston in 1670. Discussion appears in letters from the governor as well
as reports produced in Sevilla and Madrid. Junta de Guerra de Indias (War
Council of the Indies) , January 22, 1669, SD 852;Junta de Guerra de Indias,
March 8, 1669, SD 852; Governor Francisco de la Guerra to the King, January
27, 1670, SD 852; Gabriel Bernardo de Quiros to Casa de Contrataci6n, May
6, 1670, Contrataci6n (CT) 5042, AGI; Governor Cendoya to Queen Regent,
November 6, 1671, SD 839; Francisco Davila Orej6n to Francisco Fernandez de
Madrigal, January 3, 1672, SD 855; A later deposition taken in 1726 cited the
Bahamas Channel as an important reason for early settlement in St. Augustine,
September 16, 1726, SD 844.
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and refused to issue him the salary he was owed. The surgeon
was finally forced to leave in 1668, and in an ironic twist of fate ,
- Searles captured the frigate carrying Piques off the coast of Cuba.
According to the account given by the treasurer of St. Augustine,
Juan Menendez Marquez, the Frenchman incited Searles to attack
St. Augustine and provided intelligence regarding defenses and
terrain. This intelligence was instrumental in Searles' success. 9

The Background
By 1668 Searles was a seasoned leader of expeditions,
operating as a privateer on some occasions and on others as
a pirate. As a privateer, his activities were officially sanctioned
by royal authorities through a license called a letter of marque,
usually issued during times of war. The Spanish, understandably,
had little patience for such distinctions, although they also
engaged privateers when convenient. The seventeenth century was
a tumultuous period in the Caribbean and St. Augustine was not
exempt from the excitement. Spain struggled to maintain control
of its unoccupied territories as English, French, and Dutch forces
established colonies on lands once claimed by the Spanish. 10 In
1655, a large English fleet captured the Spanish island ofJamaica. 11
Spanish officials in Florida feared that the English might take Cuba
next. If they controlled both islands, they would be free to terrorize
Spanish shipping and coastal settlements such as St. Augustine.
Although the English never took Cuba in the seventeenth century,
Port Royal, Jamaica emerged as an English Caribbean base for
contraband trade, privateering, and piracy. Privateers differed
from pirates only in the sense that their activities were officially

9
10

11

Juan Menendez Marquez to the Queen, July 4, 1668, SD 233; Arana, 8-9.
Hilary M. Beckles, "The Hub of Empire: The Caribbean and Britain in the
Seventeenth Century," in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume 1, ed .
Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 219-221 ; Philip P.
Boucher, France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics ofDiscontent? (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) , 69-70, 75-81, 87; Lyle McAlister, Spain
and Portugal in the New World 1492-1700 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984) , 308; Hoffman, 76-77, 143-145.
In 1654, Oliver Cromwell sent Admiral William Penn and General Robert
Venables to seize Spanish possessions in the New World as part of the plan
called the Western Design. The fleet failed to take its primary target of Santo
Domingo, but succeeded in taking the under populated island of Jamaica in
May 1655. Hoffman, 129, 364, n. 15.
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sanctioned by royal authorities and took place during times of war.
Slaves were among the most lucrative illicit commodities traded in
the Caribbean and evidence suggests that a contraband slave trade
based in Jamaica supplied both English and Spanish colonists as
early as 1661. 12
Searles' attack on St. Augustine was shaped by these
developments. Although Searles claimed to have a letter of marque
from Sir Thomas Modyford, Governor ofJamaica (1664-1671), the
Spanish regarded him as just another pirate. The official English
position on the employment of privateers also changed frequently
in the 1660s as diplomatic relations between England and Spain
alternately advanced or broke down and Searles sometimes found
himself on the wrong side of the new regulations. He was punished
at least twice by Governor Modyford for acts of piracy during
peacetime, and was forced to surrender the Spanish ships he had
taken. His rudder and sails were also confiscated temporarily. 13
Prior to attacking St. Augustine, Searles sailed on a number
of other raids on Spanish territories. In 1664 he participated in
a devastating attack on Granada, a city on Lake Nicaragua, led

12

13

Kris E. Lane, Pillagi,ng the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 34-35, 40;Johannes Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic
Slave Trade, 1600-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3334; Nuala Zehedieh, "The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish
Contraband Trade, 1655-1692," William and Mary Quarterly 43, no. 4 (1986),
575-576, 589-592. In 1677, Spain 's royal officials finally permitted Spaniards to
travel to English colonies to purchase slaves. Trade expanded in the 1680s and
local officials and merchants, particularly in Port Royal, found many ways to
profit.
Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, August 19-22, 1664, no. 789, and letter of
Governor Sir Thomas Modyford to the Duke of Albermarle, October 1, 1668,
in W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., 'America and West Indies', Calendar of State Papers
Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 5: 1661-1668 (London: Longman &
Co. 1880), 615-616; Clarence Henry Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies
in the XVII Century (New York: E.P. Dutton &Co., 1910), 120-122, 131-133;
Lane, 34-35, 62-64. When Modyford arrived inJamaica to serve as governor
in 1664, he was instructed not to grant letters of marque and to encourage
trade with the Spanish colonies. English representatives were attempting to
negotiate greater commercial privileges and the frequent attacks on Spanish
shipping undermined their negotiations. Searles brought two Spanish ships
into Jamaica in August, both of which were restored to the Spaniards. In 1665,
Lord Albemarle altered the original orders, permitting Governor Modyford
to issue letters of marque at his discretion. These orders were revised again in
1667, though the privateers only had permission to attack Spanish ships, not
settlements. Thus Searles' 1668 attack on the Florida frigate was sanctioned,
but his sacking of St. Augustine was not.
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by the Dutch privateer Edward Mansfield. Mansfield moved his
forces up the San Juan River in smaller boats under the cover of
-darkness in order to approach the city without raising the alarm,
a tactic Searles would later employ in his raid on St. Augustine.
During 1665 and 1666, Searles also participated in attacks on Costa
Rica, Providence Island, and Tobago. The raid on Tobago in 1666
was particularly lucrative. The pirates stole many slaves to sell in
Barbados, and dismantled and destroyed items they could not take
with them. Two years later, Searles sailed the waters off the coast
of Cuba, hoping to capture Spanish silver galleons. Although he
failed to capture any silver ships, Searles did manage to intercept a
frigate from St. Augustine sent to fetch emergency foodstuffs. This
seems to be when he met Piques, the source of his interest in St.
Augustine. In his colorful, early history of buccaneers, Alexander
0. Exquemelin mentions Searles' failed attempt on the Cuban
coast and suggests that he went to St. Augustine in search of an
easy raid to satisfy his restless crew. On the way Searles seized the
ship bearing St. Augustine's situado. 14

The Raid
Searles arrived off the coast of St. Augustine with both ships on
May 28, 1668. Relying on Piques, he was able to mimic the expected
procedure for arriving ships which often had to wait for the tide to
take them over the sand bar in the harbor. When the local pilot
sailed out in his launch to meet the ship, he was captured and
coerced into conveying the familiar signals that lulled the soldiers
on land into a false sense of security. Searles waited until midnight
to launch his attack. Corporal Miguel de Monzon, who was fishing
at the time, saw the pirates. Although the pirates shot him twice, he
still managed to give at least some advanced notice to the soldiers
of the fort. The pirates tore through the town and ransacked
homes while residents fled to the fort or to the woods. During this
14

Governor Lord Willoughby of Barbados to Sec. Lord Arlington, January 29,
1666, in Calendar of State Papers Colonial America and West Indies, Volume 5,354355; Alexander 0. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America (London: Swan
Sonnenschein & co. , n.d.) , 74-76; Haring, 121-122, 135-136; Lane, 112. In his
account, Exquemelin attributes the attack on Granada to Searles' leadership.
Elsewhere, it is attributed to Mansfield. The wealth accumulated from the
attack was sufficient to gain Searles some renuwn and Exquemelin described
Searles as having attained the status of "admiral" among the buccaneers based
out ofJamaica.
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initial invasion, Sergeant Major Nicolas Ponce de Leon was able to
remove one hundred and thirty men, women, and children to the
. safety of the woods. He also tried to regroup the soldiers not on
duty. Governor Guerra y Vega escaped his house and fled to the
fort, but his secretary, Alonso de Ojeada, was killed. 15
After the initial sweep of terror, the pirates organized an
attack on the fort itself. Barricaded in the crumbling wooden fort,
the governor and thirty-three soldiers managed to hold them off.
Unfortunately, the glowing fuses of their matchlock guns gave
away their position in the dark, making it possible for the pirates
to pick them out as they stood at the wall of the fort. During the
attack on the fort five soldiers were killed and another five were
wounded. Nevertheless, Searles and his men were unable to gain
control of the fort, suffering eleven men dead and nineteen
wounded. Rather than continue the unsuccessful assault, they
withdrew and returned to the task of sacking the city. By the time
the pirates retired in the early hours of the morning, they had
stolen most of the moveable wealth in the city and killed sixty
residents. While the pirates were distracted by the attack on the
fort, Guerra y Vega had sent messengers to the woods looking for
scattered soldiers and residents. Eventually they found Sergeant
Major Ponce de Leon who had managed to locate seventy other
soldiers. He brought them to the fort at dawn, but by then the
damage had already been done. 16
Searles' pirates took both material and human prizes. Among
the goods stolen was a large quantity of silver, canvas sails, wax
candles, altar decorations, and jewelry. They took as many as
seventy hostages, including men, women, and children. According
to the accounts of the parish priest and the royal officials, the
pirates also took a number of Indian laborers and servants who
worked for Spanish families. Of particular concern to the officials
who wrote accounts of the attack were ten or twelve young women
of elite families who were held for ransom. The parish priest,
Francisco de Sotolongo, offered himself as a prisoner in order
15
16

Arana, "The Basis of a Permanent Fortification," 4-6.
Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to Queen, March 15, 1670 and
December 26, 1670, SD 852; Governor Cendoya of Florida to Queen, March
24, 1672, SD 839; Governor Cendoya of Florida to the Queen, August 24, 1675,
SD 839;Juan Menendez Marquez to King on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668,
SD 233; Arana, "The Basis of a Permanent Fortification," 5-7; Arana, "Aid to St.
Augustine after the Pirate Attack, 1668-1670," El Escribano 7, no. 3 (1970), 79.
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to watch over the young women and protect them from the
pirates. 17 Searles demanded water, meat, and wood in exchange
·for the Spanish captives. Governor Guerra y Vega accepted the
terms of exchange, but requested that Searles leave the city some
flour since St. Augustine was facing a food shortage. According to
Father Sotolongo, the young women were put ashore quickly but
the priest spent six days on the ship with the other hostages while
Guerra y Vega gathered their ransom. Upon complete delivery of
the supplies, the priest and all other Spanish captives were left on
the beach. Searles kept the others he had taken prisoner in order
to sell them as slaves in the Caribbean. 18
The Aftermath

Governor Guerra y Vega and the townspeople feared that since
Searles and his men had sounded the harbor and left the town
intact, they planned to return with a force capable of taking the
city and the fort. Florida's religious and royal officials wrote to the
Governor of Cuba, the Viceroy of New Spain, and the Queen Regent
Mariana for immediate supplies and reinforcements. Although the
pirates had returned some of the flour from the stolen situado ship,
it was insufficient. Governor Guerra y Vega cut back on rations
and commandeered a Cuban frigate at port in Apalache to bring
emergency supplies of maize to St. Augustine. Unfortunately, the
ship ran into bad weather and was wrecked in the Florida Keys.
Searles had left the St. Augustine harbor launch and the frigate
behind, but stole their sails and the spare sail canvas from the royal
warehouse. Without sails, the people of the city had to sew together
smaller bits of canvas in order to put to sea a ship that could send
for help. It was not until August 8 that the frigate was able to sail
for Havana, and it was early September by the time the governor of
Cuba, Francisco Davila Orej6n, received news of the attack. 19

17

18

19

Arana, "The Basis of a Permanent Fortification," 7-8;Juan Menendez Marquez
to King on conditions in Florida,July 4, 1668, SD 233; Francisco de Sotolongo
to the King, July 4, 1668, SD 235.
Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SD
235; Landers, 17. Taking hostages was a common practice among Caribbean
pirates. Spaniards were generally ransomed and others of mixed racial descent
were sold. A mixture of Spanish, Indian, and black hostages were also taken
in the 1682 pirate raid on St. Augustine, though the total was much smaller.
Bushnell, Situado and Saban a, 162.
Arana, "Aid to St. Augustine after the Pirate Attack," 76.
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In his letter to Governor Davila Orej6n and in later assessments,
Governor Guerra y Vega blamed Sergeant Major Ponce de Leon
for leading the soldiers and their families to the forest rather than
organizing a counterattack while the buccaneers looted the town.
The governor argued that he was unfit for his post since he was a
criollo, or someone born in the colonies rather than Spain. Moreover,
he had no other military background or training beyond his service
in Florida. These accusations were part of a larger contest to find
someone to blame for the devastating sack of the city. They were
also symptomatic of the political rivalries within the city. Tensions
between the Spanish governor and the elite criollo families of
Florida had been growing, but the raid created a new opportunity
for both sides to voice their complaints. When Governor Guerra
y Vega asked for reinforcements, he made a point of asking for
Spaniards, not more criollos from Mexico. 20
The parish priest, Father Sotolongo, placed the blame squarely
upon the governor. He told the crown that Guerra y Vega spent
his time chasing women and had neglected his duty to protect the
city. Worse yet, he had been living openly with a mistress, despite
being admonished by the priest. Father Sotolongo even criticized
the governor from the pulpit, undoubtedly fanning the flames
of local politics. The priest viewed the attack as an act of God, a
punishment for Guerra y Vega's sins. A letter from the treasury
official in the colony, Juan Menendez Marquez, also blamed the
governor, citing his mistreatment of Piques as the immediate cause
of the attack. He criticized the Sergeant Major as well, claiming he
was not capable of mounting a real military defense. He believed
that had the Spaniards mounted some kind of counter-attack, the
city might not have been sacked, or at least not have been sacked
so thoroughly. 21
In his own defense, Governor Guerra y Vega cited the speed with
which he ran to the fort to take up arms alongside the few soldiers
who remained to defend it. According to his accounts, without his

20

21

Juan Menendez Marquez to King on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SD 233;
Governor Guerra y Vega to the Queen enclosed in Governor Francisco Davila
Orej6n to the Queen , October 29, 1668, SD 233; Junta de Guerra de Indias,
January 22, 1669, SD 852 (two letters). The Council of the Indies responded
positively, and promised Guerra y Vega "legitimate Spaniards," (second letter).
Francisco de Sotolongo to the King on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SD
235; Juan Menendez Marquez to King on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668,
SD 233.
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effective leadership, the pirates would have taken the fort as well.
Despite the complaints of his rivals, the governor never faced any
-charges connected to his defense of the city in his residencia, an
audit of his administration. The residencia was usually performed
by the governor's successor and included a critical assessment
of his judicial, military, and financial decisions. In this instance,
Guerra y Vega's successor, don Manuel de Cendoya, was extremely
diligent and also conducted a secret investigation. Male residents
of the city were asked a series of thirty-four questions regarding
Governor Guerra y Vega's character and judgment during his
administration. None of the respondents in the secret inquiry
testified to any morally inappropriate behavior on the part of the
governor, despite being questioned on this topic closely. Perhaps
this was because by the time of the investigation, Governor Guerra
y Vega had married his mistress, Dona Lorenza de Aspiolea, and
legitimized their three children. 22 Royal officials were prohibited
from marrying locally during their time in office, which likely
explains his marriage immediately following the end of his term
as governor. The charges he faced at the end of his term revolved
around the sale of contraband goods, mismanagement of supplies,
and his judgment in sentencing soldiers to serve time at distant
outposts as punishment for their crimes. 23
Before Searles left St. Augustine he freed all his Spanish
hostages, but sailed away with all those who were not of European
descent, including Native Americans and free blacks. If it were
22

23

Doiia Aspiolea had brought three children to the priest for baptism before
1672, but declined to have the father listed in the baptismal record, as she was
unmarried. Her children were thus "naturales," a designation that indicated
they were illegitimate, but their parents could marry if they chose. From the
perspective of the church, obstacles to marriage would have existed if one
or both parents were already married, or if they were too closely related.
Once Doiia Aspiolea and Guerra y Vega were married, the children became
legitimate retroactively, and the priest made a note of this in the baptismal
records. Catholic Parish Records (CPR), St. Augustine, FL, Baptisms,Joseph,
October 9, 1666, Maria, January 15, 1669, and Augustina, February 10, 1671;
CPR, Marriages, Francisco de la Guerra y Vega, July 12, 1671. Guerra y Vega
married Dona Aspiolea just six days after Governor Cendoya took up his post.
Governor de la Guerra y de la Vega to King on Florida, August 8, 1668, SD
225; Residencia of Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega, Cuaderno 2, Secret
Inquiry, and Cuaderno 3, Charges, Discharges, and Sentence, 1672, EC 155-C,
AGI; (CPR), Baptisms, Augustina, February 10, 1671; CPR, Marriages, 1672.
Guerra y Vega argued that the soldiers in question were slated for more severe
punishment, but he used his authority to spare them and put them to use
instead.
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not for the efforts of Father Sotolongo, those captives might
have vanished from the historical record entirely. While onboard
Searles' ship, the priest argued that the free black and Native
American hostages should be released since they were free people
and subjects of the king, just like the Spanish. The pirate, however,
cared little for the subtleties of race and legal status in the Spanish
American world and departed with all the dark-skinned individuals
he had stolen. In a letter to the King of Spain, Sotolongo recounted
this argument, and begged him to find a way to rescue the captives.
He explained that these were free and rational people, the same
as Spaniards, despite their African and Native American heritage:
Sir, among the prisoners that the enemy held were some
Indians of this province that were in the service of some
citizens and I could not get the enemy to let them go with
the rest of the prisoners. As they were free and possessed
of the same reason as the Spaniards, I also proposed the
esteem your majesty has for the Indians, to which he
responded that it was a specific point in his instruction
and patent from the governor of Jamaica that they would
receive no color but that of the Spanish, considering as
slaves Indians, mulattos, and blacks, although they are by
nature free, I give your majesty notice of this particularity,
if they live, in order to provide a remedy to secure the
liberty of your vassals ... 24
Father Sotolongo also took the liberty of reminding the king of his
obligation to his vassals. 25

24

25

Friar Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SD 235. "Senor entre
los prisioneros que logia el enemigo fueron algunos indios desta Provincia
de los que asistfan en servicio de algunos vecinos, y no pude conseguir con
el enemigo, que los largaste con los demas prisioneros, pues eran libres y
militaba en ellos la misma raz6n que en los espanoles proponiendole tambien
la estimaci6n que Vuestra Majestad hace de los indios, a que me respondi6
que era particular capftulo de su instrucci6n y patente de su gobernador
de Jamaica el no reciban ningD.n color sino fuese el de espanol, dando por
esclavos a Indios, mulatos, y negros, aunque por su naturaleza sean libres, de
esta particularidad doy cuenta a VM para que si vivfa se proveer de remedio
al seguro de la libertad de sus vasallos ... " All translations are mine unless
otherwise noted.
Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SD 235.Father Sotolongo's
choice of words was no accident. His description of the natives as gente de raz6n,
or rational people, emphasized their status as free subjects under Spanish law.
McAlister, 392.
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The priest's concern for the captives taken by Searles is unique
in the correspondence surrounding the pirate raid. Governor
Guerra y Vega mentioned that some Indians were taken, but the
kidnapping of a few Indians clearly did not rank high on his list
of priorities. Treasurer Menendez Marquez commented that
Searles left with some of the sailors he had captured. 26 Since some
Native Americans in the city worked as mariners, it is possible
that the sailors mentioned by the treasurer were of mestizo or
Indian descent. Only Father Sotolongo's letter, however, offers any
indication of the ethnic diversity of the captives Searles kidnapped.
Along with Indians, he mentions mestizos with Spanish fathers as
well as mulattos and blacks. 27
Sotolongo's compelling advocacy was likely the result of his
professional background as a lawyer and a priest. 28 Prior to his
service in Florida, he had practiced law in New Spain, the Yucatan
province, and Havana. As parish priest, Sotolongo ministered to
the residents of the St. Augustine parish, including Spaniards,
mestizos, blacks, and Spanish-speaking Indians who worked in the
city. As the religious leader responsible for the spiritual welfare of
the entire population of the city, Father Sotolongo was most likely
to recognize the black, Indian, and mestizo captives on the ship
and know their parentage and legal status. 29
The priest's passionate and articulate advocacy was undoubtedly
influenced by his relationship with the captives, but the raid may
have dealt a blow to his ego as well, because a recent English convert
under the priest's tutelage also left with the pirates. John Henry
Woodward was a young English surgeon who accompanied Captain
Robert Sanford in his exploration of the South Carolina coast in
26

27
28

29

Governor Guerra y Vega to the Queen, August 8, 1668, SD 225; Governor
of Cuba Francisco Davila Orejon to the Queen, with enclosures from the
Governor of Florida, October 29, 1668, SD 233; Juan Menendez Marquez to
the Queen,July 4, 1668, SD 233.
Friar Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SD 235; Testimony of
Francisco de Sotolongo, November 2, 1689, SD 864.
Father Sotolongo was one of a series of diligent and talented parish priests who
shaped religious life in seventeenth-century St. Augustine. His predecessor,
Father Cristobal Bonifaz de Ribera, was promoted to Havana and eventually
attained the position of ecclesiastical judge and vicario general for that city.
Service and merits of Cristobal Bonifaz de Ribera, n.d. Indiferente General
(IG) 201, AGL
Testimony of Father Sotolongo, November 2, 1689, SD 864; Robert L. Kapitzke,
Religion, Power, and Politics in Colonial St. Augustine (Gainesville: University Press
ofFlorida, 2001) , 27, 134, 152.
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1666. Woodward allowed himself to be exchanged as a hostage
at Santa Elena for the cacique's nephew, who left with Sanford,
and soon learned the Native American language and trade routes.
He then surrendered to a Spanish patrol and was taken to St.
Augustine in 1667. Once there, he expressed interest in converting
to Catholicism. Father Sotolongo educated the young man in
Catholic doctrine, and they passed the time by conversing in Latin.
The priest baptized Woodward in March 1668. 30
Shortly after, Woodward left with Searles' crew, now possessing
useful knowledge of the indigenous networks in the Southeast and
Spanish defenses in Florida. His defection contributed to Spanish
fears that the English would return in greater force to take the city.
Searles carried Woodward to the Leeward Islands where he served
as a surgeon on a privateering ship in order to earn money for a
return trip to England. A little over one year later his ship was caught
in a storm and he was cast ashore on Nevis. From Nevis Woodward
travelled to Barbados and joined the expedition sent to settle
Carolina where his critical knowledge of the region would soon be
put to good use. 31 Woodward went on to become the architect of
diplomatic and trade relations between the English colonists and
the native chiefdoms of the Southeast. In light of his subsequent
career, it is tempting to suggest that Woodward's interest in the
Catholic faith was a ruse designed to give him freer access to the St.
Augustine community. If Father Sotolongo realized the full extent
of his betrayal while aboard Searles' ship, he certainly did not hint at
it in his royal correspondence. Nevertheless, it may have influenced
the tone of outrage evident in the priest's letter to the king. 32
In his report, the Governor of Cuba commented that by the
time he received notice of the pirate raid, it was too late to go in
search of the buccaneers or recover the people and goods stolen
from St. Augustine. 33 Since he left Woodward in the Leeward
Islands, Searles might have chosen to sell his cargo of slaves there,
30

CPR, Baptisms, Woodward, March 24, 1668; Joseph W. Barnwell, "Dr. Henry
Woodward, the First English Settler in South Carolina, and Some of His
Descendants," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 8 (1907), 3031.

31
32
33

Barnwell, "Dr. Henry Woodward," 32; Robert M. Weir, Colonial South Carolina,
A History (New York: KTO Press: 1983) , 58.
Hoffman, 143, 145-146; Verner Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 6-7, 324.
Governor of Cuba Francisco Davila Orej6n to the Queen, with enclosures from
the Governor of Florida, October 29, 1668, SD 233.
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but the most likely locales were Barbados or Jamaica. He had sold
his plunder in Barbados at least once before, after the 1666 raid
on Tobago. Future research in the English colonial archives may
reveal more about the fate of the St. Augustine captives. 34
Searles' attack reaffirmed the strategic importance of St.
Augustine to the security of Spanish shipping in the region and
his theft of free men for the slave market of Port Royal highlighted
the continued connections between piracy and the slave trade .35
The Searles raid was only the opening salvo, foreshadowing
greater conflict to come. In the latter half of the seventeenth
century the English presence in North America and the Caribbean
grew rapidly and English port cities sprang up along the eastern
seaboard offering pirates and merchants a number of new outlets
for trade and the sale of contraband goods. Pirates raided Florida
frequently in the 1680s. 36 As historians continue to investigate the
place of Florida in the greater Atlantic world and mysteries such as
the fate of Searles' prisoners, the fluid and complex connections
between Spanish Florida and their European challengers will come
in to even sharper focus.
The Searles raid was but one of many pirate attacks on
vulnerable Spanish ports, but the argument between the priest and
the pirate hints at the imperial clashes to come between Spain and
England, conflicting understandings of race and status, and the
undercurrents of commerce that so deeply influenced imperial
and local life.
34

35

36

A letter from Modyford suggests that Searles was not seen in Jamaica between
1668 and March 1670 when he arrived at Port Morant with a crew of seventy
men. Searles heard that the governor was angry with him for the sacking of St.
Augustine and sailed to Macaray Bay to avoid answering for his actions. He was
arrested about a month later but released later that year, in time to participate
in Henry Morgan's 1670 raid on Panama. If Searles went to Jamaica with his
captives, he managed to do so without attracting Modyford's attention or giving
the governor his share of the booty. Governor Sir Thomas Modyford to Sec.
Lord Arlington, March 18, 1670, and April 20, 1670, in W. Noel Sainsbury, ed.,
'America and West Indies', Calendar ofState Papers Colonial, America and West Indies,
Volume 7: 1669-1674 (London: Eyre and Spotiswoode, 1889), 57-64; William
Dampier, Dampier's Voyages (Edinburgh: Ballantine, Hansen, & Co., 1906), 154;
Zehedieh, "The Merchants of Port Royal," 588-590; Lane, 117. Modyford took a
cut of all the privateering profits that passed through Jamaica.
For more on the connections between piracy and the slave trade, see Elliott,
224-226; Lane, 34-37; Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement:
Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Emfrire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 117-120.
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 161-166; Landers, 21.
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